

# Reduction of sentinel wrong line placement events using a structured, longitudinal approach to safety event reviews

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Disclosures: None

## Introduction


The Joint Commission adopted a formal Sentinel Event Policy in 1996 to encourage investigation of patient safety events that are not related to a patient's underlying condition.

High reliability organizations create a culture of safety by having a transparent process of careful review and action planning. Safety concerns are reported through our internal system and reviewed at the local level to determine if we had a deviation from generally accepted practice standards (gaps). If a deviation is identified, we evaluate how the patient was affected and work with the Michigan Medicine Office of Patient Safety to determine the appropriate level of review needed. Sentinel events require Apparent Cause Analysis (ACA) reviews regardless of patient harm level.






# Methods



In December 2022 there was identification of a wrong line placement classified as a sentinel event, triggering an apparent cause analysis (ACA) review with VIR Faculty and the Radiology Safety Program Manager.




- 1. Staff involved were interviewed identified how the team experienced the event
- 2. "Go See" Visualize where the work is done
- 3. Event mapping established where deviation from generally accepted practice standards (gaps) occurred
- 4. "5 Why's" Root Cause analysis

- 5. Identification of the Error Type, Individual Failure Mode (IFM) and System Failure Mode(SFM) as defined by HPI.
- 6. Impact/Effort Matrix constructed to brainstorm ideas.
- Action plan identified as high impact/low effort implemented to address the system issues discovered.



# Our investigation identified three system weaknesses

- 1. A causal risk related to the look-alike, soundalike nature of two vascular access catheters:
  - Trifusion (Not for dialysis, tunneled catheter)
    Trialysis (For Dialysis, non-tunneled catheter)
- 2. General lack of knowledge regarding the different types of catheters and their uses.
- 3. Communication among the care team is not structured or documented.



#### **Action Plan Interventions:**

Red Sticker Labels Created

NOT FOR DIALYSIS USE

#### 2/23/2023


- Look alike/sound alike products
- Knowledge gap related to catheter uses

#### Staff Education

#### 2/23/2023

Knowledge gap related to catheter uses

In June 2023 there was identification of 2 additional wrong line placements that were Trifusion catheters placed instead of a Trialysis catheter. Apparent cause analysis review with same team members (VIR Faculty and Radiology Safety Program Manager).



- 1. Staff involved were interviewed identified how the team experienced the event
- 2. Event mapping was completed to determine where the deviation from generally accepted practice standards (gaps) occurred.
- 3. 3 events evaluated together in additional RCA to identify trends.

- 4. Identification of the Error
  Type, Individual Failure Mode
  (IFM) and System Failure
  Mode(SFM) as defined by HPI.
- 5. Impact/Effort Matrix constructed to brainstorm ideas.
- 6. High Impact/High Effort Action plan developed addressing additional system issues identified.

#### 4th Wrong Line Event

While completing these ACA reviews, an additional wrong line placement event occurred with slightly different circumstances. However, completing the same steps of the review process, with the same team members, allowed us to determine that the Action Plans in development would address the new event as communication breakdown was identified as the apparent cause.

# Root Cause Analysis (RCA)

#### **Recurring Concerns**

Lack of knowledge related to catheter uses

Wrong catheter selected from stock room

Proceduralist did not cross check

#### **Communication Gaps**

Initial order reviewed and scheduled by PA

No expectation or standard work for documentation of communication

Incorrect treatment length selected on order; Clinical indication not familiar to IR HO

Communication attempted with inpatient team; incorrect assumptions made

#### **Action Plan Interventions:**



PA progress note added to EMR for Inpatients

Reference Document Developed


#### 10/16/2023

- Definitive review of clinical state by the procedural PA team, with documentation entered in EMR to communicate the treatment plan to the entire care team.
- Continuous audit of practice adoption

#### 1/17/2024

- Knowledge related to central venous catheter selection based on need
- Comprehensive education to all team members involved in vascular access procedures

# **Events/Interventions**





## Results

Initial interventions did not address the gap in communication between all team members. The addition of a progress note documented in the EMR by the consulting PA, detailing the care plan, was adopted to improve communication. Continued auditing and assignment of accountability has increased compliance to >90% consistently as of July 2024.

Our team also created an educational reference to be displayed in the procedure rooms to guide the staff on Central Venous Catheter selection by clinical indication and expected line uses.

# Compliance of entering Progress Note into EMR







# **Discussion**

Utilizing a systematic approach to safety event reviews improves patient outcomes.

The initial qualitative assessment can be compiled quantitatively to identify recurring themes and trends.

Subsequent event reviews are important to evaluate the efficacy of interventions and guide future action planning efforts.

The need for multiple interventions is not an uncommon occurrence. Complex problems often require complex solutions.

# Thank You

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## References

- 1. <a href="https://www.jointcommission.org/resources/sentinel-event/sentinel-event-policy-and-procedures/">https://www.jointcommission.org/resources/sentinel-event/sentinel-event-policy-and-procedures/</a>
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